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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
\\'I LL! .\.\1 K X :\ YLOR, 'WILLIAM 
t·o:-::-;EY .. lA~lES L. XEVILLE and 
HL.H: E. IL\ \'SEX, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
;-: .\ LT L\ KE CITY CORPORA-
Tl< 1.\, a municipal corporation. J. 
HIL\CK EX LEE, HERBERT F. 
"\L\ln', nEORUE B. CATMULL, 
l' ti~ HAD HARRISON, JOE L. 
l'llHISTEXSE~, RAY ROLFSON, 
and .\LDEH-WALLACE, INC., a 
l 'tah <'orporation, 
JJd<'ndants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10373 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STA TK\1EXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an a<'tion for declaratory judgment and in-
.iunetiw relief challPnging the validity of an ordinance 
t'naC'tPd hy Salt Lake City Corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Tlw trial rourt, sitting without a jury, tried the case 
on thP merits and entered judgment in favor of the de-
frndants, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. 
•) 
RELIEF' SOI'OHT OX \P .r PEAL 
Plaintiff~, 'Villiarn Cos~PY and BlaP }' If 
. . · ~. ansE>n, ~k 
nwersal of tlw Jlld<rllwnt of clis1111· '-'sal an I 
• • • .-. • • • < c an nrdt>r rli. 
rertmg thP trial eourt to PntPr jud<mwnt in fa\· .. 
• • • • • l"l or or th, 
plamtif f~, or, that failing-, a new trial. 
STA TE~IEXT OF F .AC'T8 
On t}w h:t day of Oetolwr, 19fi3, thP Board of Cnru. 
~nissionNs of Salt LakP City pa~sPd an ordinanrr rhan~. 
mg the zoning <'lassifieation of approxirnatt>ly one-half 
of a <·ity hlo<'k from an "H-G'' ( apartnwnt housp) rlassi. 
fication to a "B-3" (husinPss) elassifieation. Thi~ suit 
was instih1tPd on Odolwr :30, 1963, for judgment deelar. 
ing the ordinance invalid and in excess of the City'1 
power and authority. 
On March 11, 1964, th<' case canw on for pretrial 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. Upon motion of J,.. 
frndants' attorneys tlw pretrial judge entered an order 
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint (R. 50). The cause n 
then appPaled to the Suprt>me Court and this Court's 
decision reversed the judgnwnt of dismissal entered~ 
the district court and directed the latter court to try th! 
cause on the nwrits ( 16 Vtah 2d 19:2, 398 P. 2d 27). FW. 
lowing the rt>mand to the district court, the case o 
pretried by the Honorable .Merrill C. Faux. On the P~ 
trial order of .Judgf> Faux the rase was tried on Ma.rd 
29-31 1965 before the Honorable Stewart M. H&Dill 
' ' sitting without a jury. The trial judge entered findilJI 
of fact conclusions of law and a judgment in favorl 
' 
• 
1: 1 •• do·!'· 11dant:-:, dirPding- dismissal of thP complaint (R. 
l'l:untitT•' <· 1111t<·ntions an' surnmarizPd in the pre-
11 i:tl ,,,d,·r 1 IC :-1::). Th1•:-:1· an•, runong otht:>r things, that 
t: ... /.•111111~ a"ti1111 i:-: not in tl<'<'ordaneP with a romprehen-
~1\·,. pla11 a:-- n·•p1in·d liy thP provisions of Section 10-9-3, 
I _( '. \. I~,.-,:;: that t Ju• anwndnwnt of the zoning map is 
,, .1 ~1q1p11rt•·d IJy a showing of changed conditions which 
-.1;1r1a1>t tlw a11H·1Hl11wnt, and that no notice of the pro-
i">~• d a111 .. 11<h111•11t of tht> l"st> District ~lap was given as 
r"1p1in·d ''>- ~1·1·tio11 10-D-5, CC.A. 1953. Each of these 
all1·.::ati1111:- an· dl'ni1•d liy tlw defendants. In the opinion 
111' 1.laintiff:-: · <'oun:-:(•I, tlwn· is no material conflict in the 
,., 1d1·1w1· 11r \\ ith n•spl'd to n•asonable inferences to be 
drawn f'rnm tlw PYidPnee. 
( ln or about SPptPmher 1, 1927, Salt Lake City 
111actl'd a ~oning ordinanre> and adopted a Use District 
~lnp in pur:-:nmwl' of a eornprelwnsive plan for the zoning 
111' ~alt Lakl' City. A planning commission was appointed 
''> tlt1· City in ae<"ordance with the provisions of Title 10. 
l 'ltapt"r !I, l"tah CodP Annotated 1953. On May 28, 1963, 
t 11 1 • d1·ft>rnlant Alder-Wallace filed with the planning 
1·0111111i:-::-;ion ib pdition for amendment of the Use Dis-
trit'f ~lap h~- c·hang-ing a part of the city block located 
ht'f''''"n !'-it>c·ond and Third South and Sixth and Seventh 
I•:a:-:t ~t1n·t~ ( Bloek -I-Ii, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey) 
l'r11m a H~·sidPntial "R-G" use district to a Commercial 
"( '-:l" <·lassifieation. The planning commission reeom-
1111·ndP<i to the city conunission that the application be 
d1·ni1>d hPeause among other things the proposed change 
4 
was eontrarv to tlH' <·01111>rPhPnsiv<> zonin(J' plan d 
. • • , !'.' an would 
eonst1tut1> "spot'' zoning- and that tlH'rP Was n nn, . ..I 0 ·~ot rt'a~on s}~ow_n. for additional hnsinPss or <'ommnl'la) 
zoning- (Exh1b1t P-1, Pgs. 22-23). Tlw citv comm·-· 
• IS!ll\\TI 
first nnan imously voted to d<•ny tlw application. Subii~. 
<~UPntly a hParing was hPld at the r<>qu<'st of the peti. 
honers and the commission reversed its previous d""'1·.-"'-- olOn 
and voted unanimously for the change in zoning. Th~ 
ehange ('ff pctf1 d hy the zoning aetion rPsnlt<>d in reelas~ 1 • 
fication from "R-G'' to a "B-3" use distrirt instf'ad of th" 
''C-3" zone sought hy th(' application. The rf'corder did 
not publish any notict' prior to th0 }waring informing thP 
public that the commission would consider a proposed 
change to the "B-3" classification (Exhibit P-1, R.1011. 
Block 46 and the properties facing it from the four 
eompass directions are and have been zoned for resi. 
dential use since the enactment of the 1927 zoning ordi. 
nance. There are many old structures in the area and 
redevelopment and rebuilding have been rapidly takin~ 
placP with nf'w structur('s built for purposes consistent 
with th0 "R-6" zoning classification (Exhibit P-12). In 
the opinion of the experts the area involved in the zoning 
change was a stable residential area with fine prospect:i 
for redevelopment consistent with the existing zonini? 
plan (R. 166). The natural effect of the rezoning was to 
interrupt this stability and cast considerable doubt nn 
the future land use and zoning of all of the abuttint 
property (R. 148-149). 
There was no evid!:'nce produced either at the hear· 
f din that ing or at the trial which would warrant a m g 
• 
aiiditi1111al <'<11111111•r<'ial or business zoning was needed. 
r 1, 1 h" 11•·n r Yi<'init:• of Block 46 there are 4111:! acres of 
r:u:-:in•·:-:"' ·· H-T· zoning-, :27/'c of which is not used for busi-
- - I. f "C 1" . 40ct. f h' :""'·"' p11rpo:-1·:-;: .>.> :.: a<'l'l'S o ,. zoning, 1o o w 1ch 
1• nr>t 11:-:1·d for hn:-;irn·ss purpo~ws; and 243.3 acres of "C-
:i · · zn11i11g-. :l'.! 1.~ '7~ of which is not used for business pur-
l"'='":-: 1 l·:\hihit P-1. P~s. 22-23; Exhibit P-13). In the 
('it~ as a who!" fiO:~.-t acres are zoned "B-3" and only 
1 ~,-...-+ a<'n·:-; an· us"d for husiness or commercial purposes 
I E\liihit P-7. Pg-. :t!). 
Tlt1· fa<'t that tlwre 1s ample available commercial 
11r l111si1wss propPrty in the near vicinity of Block 46 
s1·1·111:-: to han h1•1•n <'!early recognized by the commission . 
.\layor L1·1·, <·hair111an of the commission, testified on 
<·r11ss-1·xai11ination as follows: (R. 311) 
''Q. One of thP grounds stated in here [the plan-
ning commission report] one of the grounds 
for dPnial, 'there is already considerable land 
in the general area already zoned for busi-
ness or c>ommercial, which is not so used.' 
K ow was there any evidence at the hearing 
that indicated that this statement was not 
correctf 
A. \Veil, I think that at least I knew and u-
sumed the other commissioners knew, that 
tlwre was other ground available. 
Q. That there was other ground available! 
A. YPs. 
Q. And that the other ground that was avail-
able was already zoned for commercial or 
business? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You knew that at the time? 
A. Oh, yes." 
ConnnissionPr Harrison, also a ddPn~c· · witnPss, tPsti. 
fi ed : ( R. 3+8) 
HQ. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Commissioner Harrison were vou a h f ' ·· . ware of 
t P ~ct ~h~t thPre. was considerable land in 
the city hrmts and m the vicinity of th· . h . is zon-
mg_ c ange which _was zoned commerciallv 
which was not bemg used for conunerci~J 
purposes1 
I was, yes. 
And do you know, do you know whether or 
not that land was available for commercial 
use1 
I am sure much of it was, yes." 
In the mind of Commissioner Harrison the principal 
reasons for changing the zone classification from resi. 
dential to commercial was that privatP capital \Yas will-
ing to expend money for a comnwrcial devp]opment that 
would "clean up" an old residential area and that thw 
would be additional tax rt>venue (R. 350). Mayor Lee 
was motivated by the fact that new business would come 
into the area and place a new commercial development 
in the stead of a run-down residPntial area; that no 
buffer on Seventh East could be maintained in any event, 
and that "we have an obligation to these people who 
own property [in Block 46]" (R. 318). 
It does not appear from the Pvidence that the zoning 
action was made \vi th reference to any comprehensive 
or general plan. The planning commission reported that 
busines..; zoning in Block 46 would be contrary to the 
7 
c<>ll!Jli"i l11·11~iw plan ( Exhihit P-1, Pgs. 22-23). The zon-
ii::..:· ;id inn ''a~ in<'on~ist<·nt with thP zoning map in effect 
,111 tli·· ,;at•· of ilit> appli<'ation (Exhibit P-5) in that it 
,. ···:tt1·d a II"\\. <·0111111<·r<'ial district in the center of a 
r··,.1d( 11t ial dist :·id and y<'t within walking distance of 
,,\;,i 111'.~ <·01111n1•r<'ial districts. Further, the City had 
1
11·1·\·i,111,.J: <'rt•at<·d a llf'\\' Residential District (R-7) in-
• 11 d1·d tn lH· a hnf'frr lwtween commercial or business 
Jll'"l"'rt:· in th<· downtown ar<>a to the WPSt and residen-
tial 11rr1111•:·t~· to tlw Past (R. 126-128). This new "buffer" 
zon1· \\·n" )o('at<'d in tht> hlock west of Block 46 and the 
<'i'frd of tlw zoning aetion was to create business districts 
on !10th si<l<·s of the buffer. 
At tlw time of application for rezoning the City had 
in pffpd a ('nrrent general land use plan (Exhibit P-10). 
Thi' g1·n('!'a] plan did not contemplate a new commercial 
district in Bloek -1-G. Tht> zoning action here in crea:ting 
an 1·ntir•·l:· Ill'\\' business district (as opposed to enlarge-
nwnt ol' an Pxisting business district) is without prece-
d1•nt in C'ity history exeept in one or two instances where 
!If'\\' r('si<h,ntial <l<'YPlopnwnt has required a regional 
shopping <'<'nter ( R. 18-1-). At least six prior applications 
for lmsirn·ss or eornmercial zoning in the immediate area 
had lwPn dPnied by th<> eity commission before Block 46 
was rPzoned ( R 272-275). 
WhPn aslwd about the reference which the zoning 
aetion had to any general or comprehensive plan, Mayor 
L<>e said: (R. 31+) 
"I don't think anyone can hold to a plan in the 
h11ilding of a city." 
8 
Speaking- of thP attitndP of the citv planning · . 
· · cornnuss1on 
n·g-ardmg propost>d "B-3" zoning in the immedi t 
f B a e area o lock -1-6, Mayor Lee said: (R-315) 
"The zoni~g commission turned it down. Ma 
they are rzght, but I just don't think you can (blde 
to a plan." o 
The Salt Lake City planning director, the assistant 
C~t~~ planning director, the Salt Lake County zoning ad. 
1111mstrator, and the former County planning director 
Pach testified that in their opinions the zoning action 
was contrary to comprehensive planning and in manv 
specific respects in violation of reeognized plannin~ 
criteria and acknowledged City policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ZONING ACTION IS INVALID BE-
CAUSE IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE W1TH 
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AS REQU1RED 
BY THE ENABLING STATUTE. 
Salt Lake City is empowered by statute to "regulate 
and restrict ... the location and use of buildings, struc· 
tures and land for trade, industry, residence or other 
purposes" and for that purpose to "divide the municipali· 
ty into districts of such number, shape and area as may 
be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of [the 
statute]" (10-9-1, 2, U.C.A., 1953). The power of the 
City to enact zoning ordinances in accordance wi~ _the 
intent and purpose of the statute and within the liwta· 
tions of the statute is not questioned in this case. 
9 
Tlw City, ho,,·ever, does not have the unlimited, un-
defined and unrestricted power to legislate the use of 
propert:·. Statutory limitations are specifically imposed 
b:· Section 10-9-~1, U.C.A., 1953: 
''10-9-8. Regulations to be in accordance 
with comprPhensive plan.-Such regulations shall 
111' madP in accordance with a comprehensive p"la!n 
designed to lessen congestion in the streets to 
- ' secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, 
to promote health and the general welfare, to pro-
vide adequate light and air, to prevent the over-
crowding of land, to avoid undue concentration 
of population, to facilitate adequate provision for 
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and 
other public requirements. Such regulations shall 
be made 'with rmsonable consideration, among 
othPr things, to the character of the district and 
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and 
u·ith a view to conserving the value of buildings 
and encouraging the most appropriate use of "land 
throughout the city." (Emphasis added) 
ThP decision of this Court in Marshall v. Salt Lake 
City, 105 Ftah 111, 141 P.2d 704, fixes some guidelines 
and standards hy which the validity of municipal zoning 
action is to hf' determined. There the purpose and limita-
tions of the zoning authority were expressed as follows: 
(105 etah 111, 119-125) 
" ... As shown by the above quotes from the 
statute, the city is authorized to regulate and re-
strict 'the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures and land for trade, industry, residence and 
other purposes' and to accomplish this 'may di-
vide the municipality into Districts of such num-
ber, shape and area as may be deemed best suited 
to carry out the purposes of this Article.' (Italics 
10 
ours) This is done• lmd0r tlw police power and b 
th<> statutP must bP done• in acconlance with y 
comprehmsiv<> plan, desig110d, intPr alia to le a . . ' ssen 
congPsho_n_ m thP str<>Pt, promotP the general WP]. 
farP,_ fae1htatP transportation, and other public 
n•qu_1n•rnr>~ts. It shall be done ,,-ith reasonable 
co~s1d::at10n of th_P eharact<>r of thP (fo:triet. it~ 
smtab1hty for particular uses 'and with a view to 
. * * * d . tl (•onsPrvmg an encouragmg le most appro. 
priate use of land.' Section 15-8-91, supra. That 
thP statute contemplates a division and regulation 
hy districts, instead of n•gnlation hy singlP lnt< 
or small groups of lots, is evidPnt. The rrgu!a. 
ti on of the USP of propPrty h:- lots or hy very small 
areas is not zoning and do0s violence to the pur-
pose and provisions of the statute. It would not, 
and could not, accomplish the purpose of the law 
as sPt forth in the statute quoted supra .... 
"City zoning is authorized only as an exerrise 
of thP policP power of the state. It must there-
fore have for its purposes and objectives matters 
which come within the province of the policP 
power. "When exercised hy a city, it is of nerP~~itY 
confined by the limitations fixed in the grant by 
the state, and to accomplishment of the purposes 
for which the state authorized the city to zone. 
Those purposes, which control and must he ~uh­
served hy any zoning, are set forth in Section 15-
8-91, U.C.A., 1943, quoted supra. The elements 
required of a zoning plan are: It must be compre-
hensive; it must be desig11ed to protect the health, 
safetv and moi'als of the inhabitants; to promote 
the g~~eral welfare; avoid overcro~ding an? _c~m­
gestion in traffic and populahon; fac1htate 
transportation and other public service; and meet 
the ordinary or common requirements of hap~y, 
convenient and romfortable living by the inhabit-
ants of the districts, and thP rity as a whole.··· 
• • • 
11 
''Tlw hasic purpose of zoning is to 'bring 
aliont an onforly d(~velopment of cities, to estab-
li~h <fr.;trids into which husin<>ss, commerce, and 
irnlnstr>· sliall not intrude, and to fix certain terri-
tor:· for differ<"nt grades of industrial concerns. 
"' * " Tlw exPrcise [of this power] must have a 
'.'nl>stantial relation to the public good within the 
splwn•s hPld proper.' "White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 
:!.YI, 1 :1..J- A. -t-09, 412, 53 A.L.R. 1215. 'It is a 
fundau1ental theory of the zoning scheme that it 
shall lw for the general good, to secure reasonable 
n<'ighhorhood uniformity, and to exclude struc-
tur0s and occupations which clash therewith.' 
''Zoning is don<~ for the benefit of the city as 
a wholP, and the limitations imposed on respee-
tiv<> districts must be done with a view to the 
hr>nPfit of the district as a whole, and not from 
eomidt'ratiou of particular tracts .... • • • 
" 'Tlu• tests of validity in such cases are: 
Does the ordinance bear a reasonable relation to 
the puhlic h0alth, morals, safety or general wel-
farP: have tlw districts been created according to 
a fair and rational plan?' " 
TJin n•quir<'~lIPnt that municipal zoning be "in accordance 
with a c·ornprdwnsive plan" is similar to legislative en-
aetrnmts of morP than forty states. 
ThP Illf•aning of the term "comprehensive plan" is 
clisrussed in appellants' brief in case No. 10114 at pages 
1 S th rough 25. In brief, the comprehensive standard 
rPquir"s that the zoning ordinance or any amendments 
th<>rdo lw logically n•latc>d to considerations broader 
than th0 property imnwdiately affected and that it fit 
into somP g<•neral or over-all scheme or plan for the 
developrnPnt of the Citv as a whole. 
12 
Salt Lake City adopted a zoning map with the enact. 
ment of the 1927 ordinance (Exhibit P-2). This map 
contemplated that gt>neral business and commercial land 
use would not Pxtend Past bPyond Fifth East Street and 
that Block 4G would be ust>d for residential purposes. 
The land was actually developed on the basis of this plan 
and new development in the area of Block 46 has been 
consistent with this plan. The City, by its planning com. 
mission, conducted a further study in 1943 and published 
its plan for desirable land use, which plan also contem. 
plated that the general business and commercial district 
of the City would not <;>xtend east beyond Fifth East 
Street and that Block -±6 and the immediate area would 
be reserved for residential use (Exhibits P-8, P-9). The 
general plan for land use in effect at the time of the 
zoning change also directed that Block 46 and the im-
mediate area adjacent thereto continue in its established 
use (Exhibit P-10). 
The city commission was advised by their planning 
commission that the proposed zoning change in Block 46 
was contrary to the comprehensive plan (Exhibit P-1. 
Pgs. 22-23). The significant feature of this case, hoic-
ever, is not the departure from the general plan but the 
fact that the change was not made with reference to any 
genera-l or over-all purpose or objective in the diviswn 
and regulation of land in the city by districts. The rea-
son for the zoning action is apparent from the evidenCR 
offered by defendants and particularly from the testi-
mony of Mayor Lee and Commissioner Harrison. De· 
f endant Alder-"\\r all ace selected a site for a commercial 
development (which happened to be in an area zoned and 
13 
n~Prl for residential purposes) and represented to the city 
that if tlw cit!· would rezone that portion of the block 
,rhi<'h it had sPlected for commercial use, the developer 
,, nnld rPrnove the deteriorated structures in the rezoned 
ar•'rt aJ](l construet commercial buildings. Defendant 
.\Ider-\Vallace told the commission and the court that 
tlw landowners in the area selected would receive more 
rnorn•y for their land than they could hope to get for resi-
dl'ntial purposes and that the city would in turn derive 
mon, n•venue from Block 46 in terms of sales and pro-
pPrty taxes. The reason for the selection of residential 
property rather than expensive nearby commercial 
property is obvious. Zoning action based solely upon 
~ueh considerations is invalid beeause it does not take 
into account the requirements that the ordinance "secure 
reasonable neighborhood uniformity," "bring about an 
ordrrly development of cities ... establish districts into 
which business ... shall not intrude ... ," and "divide the 
municipality into Districts of such number, shape and 
area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the pur-
pose [of the statute]" (Marshall, supra). 
By ignoring its comprehensive plan in this instance 
the City hopes for economic gain in the improvement of 
an old residential area and increased taxes from Block 
-!6. The short-sighted nature of this sort of thinking is 
pointed up in the City's own study of 1943 (Exhibit P-8, 
Pg. 26). 
". . . changes to lower forms of land use 
should be very thoughtfully studied as to neces-
sity and location. Furthermore, it is especially 
easy for a ... commercial area to blight or reduce 
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tlw econo~ni~ us<>fulne_ss o~ an adjarPnt rrsidential 
arPa. This 1s happPnmg m thousands of cas · 
Salt Lake Cit\' tod:w with an annual ur<>nes Ill : •. . ,- - onur 
loss probably m the n!1lhons. l_Tnless, as is seldom 
th~' ras'.'- the s1wculahve value for business ... of 
this. hl1ghtt,d lan~l ean lw <'apitaliJwd upon im. 
nwd~ately, both city and the owner lose. One of 
tlH' important rPsults of planning is stability in 
land USP, and onP of tlw most drai11atie manif~sta. 
tions of poor planning or lack of planning in am 
eity is unstable property valut>s which are a ha~. 
hinger of the more serious forms of blight." 
Then' is no 1m•rPdent for tltP aetion of the City in 
this caS(' (TI. 18-1). Tlw change of zoning interrupted a 
stable District crPatPd 3G years before and cast grrat 
doubt and speeulation on land use in the entire area. 
\\l1ile this result is lwing brought about, the Chairman 
of the Board of ConnnissionPrs is saying, "I don't think 
anyone• can hold to a plan in the building of a city" (R. 
31-1). 
A similar situation was prt>senh•d in the case of 
Kuehne c. Town of East I!artford, 13G Conn. 452. 7~ 
A.2d -17-1. The facts are similar to those involved in the 
case at bar. The zoning authority of the Town of Ea8t 
Hartford rezoned propPrty in a residential zone for 
business usP. Tlw applicant intPnded to erect facilitie1 
for six or eight stores in the nature of retail stores and 
small business establishments calculated to serve the 
nt>eds of residents in tlw vicinity. A small area already 
zoned for business was located relatively close. Fifty-one 
of the residents of the area filed their petition in support 
of the change. An appeal from the zoning action was 
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tal;"n to th(• ( ~onn<'dicnt trial court where the action of 
rlw zoning anthorit~· was affirmed. On appeal the Con-
iw!'til'nt S11pn·111<' Court rewrsed, holding: (72 A.2d 
+7 -L .+ 7,-.., .+ l!l J 
":\ lilllitation upon the powers of zoning 
antlwriti(•s ... is that tlw regulations they adopt 
lllll"t IH' ma<lP 'in accordance with a comprehen-
siY<' plan.' ... 
"l n t IH' cas(' h<>fore us it is obvious that the 
"01m('i] lookPd no further than the benefit which 
mig·ht acenw to Langlois and those who resided 
in tlw Yicinity of his property, and that they gave 
no <·onsi<leration to the larger question as to the 
pffrd th<> change would have upon the general 
plan of zoning in the community." 
"The action of the town council in this case 
was not in furtherance of any general plan of 
zoning in the community and cannot be sus-
tained." 
A p1wllants r<>s1wctfully submit that the zoning action 
in this <·as<> is not in furtherance of any general or com-
preh<•nsin zoning plan and that it cannot be sustained. 
POINT II. 
Tl!E ZOXIXG ACTION IS INVALID BE-
CA l'SI·~ THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE 
OF COXDITTOXS -WHICH WOULD WAR-
RANT OR .JrSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF 
THE ZOXING MAP. 
Bloek -f(i and lands surrounding it have been zoned 
for rPsidPntial us<> since enactment of the 1927 ordinance. 
The action in th<> instant case constitutes the creation of 
an Pntirel~· new business district. The new business dis-
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triet is a suhstantial departure from the existing map or 
plan in that it is an independent district of some conse-
quene(' and size loeated in tlw center of a residential area 
and yt>t in close proximity to tlw existing commercial 
and business an'a of the City. 
Presumably, the plan existing at the time of the 
amendment (which classified the property as residential) 
was a fair, rational and comprehensive plan. This pre-
sumption is recognized in the case law. See e.g. North-
west Merchants Terminal Inc. r. O'Rourke, 191 Md. i21, 
60 A.2d 7-13, where the court said: 
"There is a presumption that zones are well 
planned and arranged and are to be more or less 
permanent sub;ject to change only to meet genuine 
change in conditions." (Emphasis added) 
One of the formal requirements underlying the 
validity of any change in the zoning ordinance is that 
there must be a corresponding change of eonditions justi-
fying the zoning amendment. In Page i:. City of Port-
land, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280, the Oregon Supreme 
Court, in striking down an amendatory ordinance, said: 
"Police power must be exercised to promote 
the general welfare of the people at large, and 
not for the interests of any private group [citing 
authorities]. Amendments to zoning ordinances 
should be made with cauti.on and only when chang-
ing conditions clearly require am~ndme1!t. Other-
wise, the very purpose of zoning will be de-
stroyed." (Emphasis added) 
To the same effect is Wilcox, et al. v. City of Pittsburgh. 
121F.2d835 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941), where the trial court had 
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disw1~sed on motion a eomplaint attacking an amenda-
tory onlinane<•. Tlw dismissal order was reversed by the 
('ll'l'llit <·ourt in an opinion which read in part as follows: 
"In the juristic sense we think the council 
have heen fully put upon their proof. The general 
principlP is eoneeded. Changes in the plan, like 
tlw enactm<:>nt of the original ordinance, are an 
pxereise of police power. . . . As conditions are 
fh,, 11(/sis and justification for zoning, clearly a 
1·hange in the former is essential to a change in 
the latter." (Emphasis added) 
TIH· genPral rule requiring "change of conditions" as a 
lmsis for anwndment of a zoning ordinance is stated in 
101 C .. J.S. 837 and the cases are collected in footnotes in 
the same volume and in the pocket parts. 
In a period of 36 years there will be some change of 
eon<litions, but the "change of conditions" referred to in 
tht> cases refers to facts or circumstances existing at the 
ri11H"' of the change which did not exist at the time of the 
orig-inal ordinance and which renders the property more 
suitable for a new or different use. Block 46 and the 
surrounding property were used for residential purposes 
at the time of the amendment and redevelopment with 
new structures was rapidly taking place consistent with 
thr residential zone. There is adequate property in the 
near vicinity already zoned for business or commercial 
purposes. Both of the commissioners who testified recog-
nizPd this fact (R. 311, 348). The undisputed evidence 
~hows that Block -1-6 was stable and redeveloping con-
sistent with the existing zone classification; that there 
is existing commercial within close proximity which is 
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availahlP for commercial use, much of which is in need 
of redevelopnwnt for conunt>rcial or business purposes 
and that the City already has far more commercial zon~ 
ing than its nPt>ds rt>quire. There is no justification 
whatever for tlw interruption of 3G years' stabilitv in 
Block 46. There being no "change of conditions" ~uch 
as to warrant tht> amendment, the zoning action is in-
valid. 
POINT III. 
THE ZO~ING ACTIO~ IS INYALID BE-
C APSE NOTICE OF THE PPBLIC HEAR-
ING WAS NOT PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED 
BYLAW. 
The zoning power of the City is limited by the statu-
tory grant of authority of the legislature. The legislature 
has specifically required that "all proposed amendments 
be first submitted to the planning commission for its 
recommendation" and that there be "15 days' notice and 
public hearing" in connection with any such amendment 
( 10-9-5, lr.c.A., 1953). The language of the statute is 
mandatory and not permissive. In the case at bar the 
petitioner did not submit any proposal for "B-3" zoning 
to the planning commission. The planning director did 
testify that ''B-3" zoning would also have had an un-
favorable recommendation from the planning commission 
( R. 160, 161). The purported notice of the public hearing 
informed the general public of a proposed change from 
"R-6" to "C-3" (Exhibit P-1, Pg. 8). Never at any time 
was there any publication of notice prior to the hearing 
indicating that the city commission would consider an 
amendment to "B-3" zoning for Block 46. It is thus 
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apparPnt that the literal requirements of the enabling 
;;tatute were ignored in this instance. It is respectfully 
~nbmitte<l that this furnishes another reason why the 
action of the zoning authority may not be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The zoning authority has not acted in the further-
ance of any general or comprehensive plan for zoning in 
the City. The amendment of the ordinance is in direct 
violation of the existing plan for orderly development of 
thP City as a whole. There is no change of conditions 
which v..arrants the interruption of the area where the 
zone change was made, and no notice was given to the 
public with respect to the proposal for creation of a new 
•'B-3" district. The judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed with directions to enter a decree declaring 
the amendatory ordinance void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Grant Macfarlane, Jr. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
